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Two years ago, in this publication, I reported on the controversies that attended on-
going efforts to reform civil litigation in the American federal courts to contain and 
constrain excessive costs, particularly of discovery.l At that time, it was uncertain 
whether the pending package of rule reforms would be adopted by our Supreme 
Court, and if so whether the Congress might take action to alter the amendments, as 
could happen under our statutory scheme. More broadly, it was unclear whether the 
political polarization that has typified both the legislative and executive branches of 
the US government would begin to intrude into the process of judicial rulemaking. 
This paper follows up on {he report of two years ago. At least some clear answers 
have emerged. The Supreme Court did adopt the amendment package, the Congress 
did not alter it, and the rule changes went into effect on 01.12.2015. Some suggest that 
the rule changes will produce big changes in litigation. For example, an article in the 
magazine of the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Litigation described the 
rule changes as «a whole new ballgame," "a game changer," and "a paradigm shift."2 
Similarly, a prominent American law professor has reacted with an article whose title 
asks whether the 2015 rule amendments mark the "end of an era."3 Whether this 
Richard Marcus, Procedural Polarizacion in America? ZZPI nC 18, p. 303. 
2 Kenneth Berman, Reinvenring Discovery under the New Federal Rules, 42 Litigation 22 
(Spring 2016). 
3 Adam Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After [he 2015 Amend-
ments, 66 Emory L.J. 1 (2016). His answer is that they do not. 
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amendment package really produces "a whole new ballgame," or ends "an era" of 
American litigation is very much up in the air. But it remains true that the rulemak-
lng apparatus is consensus driven, not polarized, and thus resistant to some features 
of other parts of the American government. 
As the American political system heats up again in preparation for another presi-
dential election, it seems that things in that arena may become even more polarized-
and perhaps in more directions - than before. As explained below, the procedure 
reformers have begun developing experimental efforts to take the 2015 amendments 
another step - pilot projects emphasizing simplified mandatory disclosure regimes. 
Meanwhile, the rule makers have refocused on another topic that sometimes gener-
ates high emotions - class actions. 
The outcome of America's political contests is impossible to predict as of this 
writing. And whether the relative tranquility of procedural developments herald an 
era of tranquility for American procedural reform is also impossible to forecast. But 
there surely is no reason at present for dire prophesies. 
/. The Unique American Background 
As most have known for a long time,4 American attitudes toward a range of topics 
have differed from the rest of the world, and not only on the scope of discovery. 
American rules on pleadings, class actions, recovery of litigation costs, and jury 
trial are also distinctive if not unique. Together they provide a uniquely claimant-
friendly atmosphere for private litigation~ which can be justified on a variety of 
political theories. 5 But with regard to discovery, American procedural reform since 
1970 has curtailed some of the untrammeled openness that was installed by amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that went into effect in that year.6 
The recurrent cries of alarm and pain about the scope and burdens of Ameri-
can discovery should be familiar to observers from other countries. They became 
familiar to participants in American litigation soon after the Federal Rules were 
adopted in 1938. Barely a decade later, a conference convened under the guidance of 
the Reporter who wrote. the original Federal Rules tncluded a complaint by a big-
4 For background from an American perspective, see Richard Marcus, Retooling American 
Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order, 7 Tulane]. Inc'l 
& Compar. Law 153 (1999) (describing the divergence between American discovery prac-
tices and those of other countries, even common law countries). 
5 For discussion, see Richard Marcus, Bomb Throwing, Democratic Theory, and Basic 
Values A New Path to Procedural Harmonization?, 107'Nwn. L Rev. 574 (2013) (ex-
ploring political cheories that would justify retaining the unique claimant-friendliness of 
American procedure). 
6 For discussion of the era from 1970 (0 1996, see Richard Marcus, Discovery Containmem 
Redux, 39 Bos. ColI. L. Rev. 747 (1998) (exploring (he numerous changes to the Federal 
Rules made since 1970, mostly to contain and constrain over-discovery); Marcus, supra 
note 1, at 303-07. 
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firm defense-side lawyer that "[t]he practically unlimited scope of discovery under 
the fedeqi rules has proved expensive and time consuming beyond any reasonable 
benefits to be derived from thern."7 Ie also included the results of a survey of ex-
isting practice reporting that "[0 Jne of the criticisms is that the expense and time 
consumed by discovery is out of all proportion to the value .... If 100 to 150 pages 
of depositions are reasonable in a tOrt case worth $20,000, then 100,000 to 150,000 
pages would in proportion in a case worth $20,000,000."8 
In 1983, the Federal RUies were amended to direct the judge to ensure that dis-
covery was proportional, but no major change in practice occurred. Subsequent 
amendments in 1993 and 2000 sought to bring proponionality to the fore, but ac-
tual practice changed only gradually. In 2010, a major conference on contemporary 
litigation practice confirmed that the concerns that had ~ready emerged sixty years 
earlier remained important, and added that owing to th'e explosion of information 
in the Digital Era they had become worse. 9 
II. The 2013 Amendment Proposals and Reactions to the;; 
The 2013 amendment proposals sought to move proportionality to a more promi-
nent position by making it a feature of the basic scope of discovery. 10 In doing so, 
it mirrored reforms two decades ago in the UK, which made proportionality a key 
ingredient in a range of procedural judgments. t lOne might also say that ie is hard 
to find lawyers who overtly favor disproportionate discovery. Instead, the custom-
ary argument favoring broad discovery is that it is necessary to enable the party 
seeking discovery to develop its case, surely a proportionate goal. On some level, 
an underlying debate might be about a set of values; the importance one attaches to 
investing resources into pursuing "justice" can color attitudes toward investment in 
discovery. If justice is a pearl beyond price, the price of very broad discovery seems 
to be worth paying. 12 
7 The Practical Operation of Federal Discovery, 12 FR.D. 131, 142 (1951) (presentation of 
Albert Connelly of Cravath, Swaine & Moore). 
8 Id. at 137-38 (presentation of william Speck of the Adminisrrarive Office of the U.S. 
Courts). 
9 See Marcus, supra notc I, at 308-09, 
10 See Fed. R. Civ, P. 26(b)(l), authorizing discovery "that is relevant to any party's claim or 
defense and proportional to the needs of the case." 
t I See Neil Andrews, English Civil Procedure 38-41 (2003) (describing the "overriding ob-
jective" of proportionaliry under Lord Woolf's reforms); Adrian AS Zuckerman, Civil 
Procedure chap. 1 (2003) (also describing proportionality as the "overriding objective" of 
the new civil procedure rules for England and Wales). 
12 For discussion of these points, see Richard Marcus, .. Looking Backward" to 1938, 162 
U. Pa. L Rev. 1691, 1716-21 (2014). 
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But the disputes in given cases tend to be about whether more discovery will 
actually produce useful informacion. At that point, lawyers must convince judges 
under the new provisions that their discovery promises evidentia.ry returns that jus-
tify the discovery costs. Judge Wistrich and Professor Rachlinski argue that Ameri-
can lawyers intrinsicaHy resist sensible assessment of this balance: «Litigators thus 
suffer from a double distOrtion: they overvalue the additional information and un-
dervalue the costs incurred by the responding party in providing the information. 
Lawyers also likely do not realize that the additional information might hinder or 
distort their own judgment."13 Instead, American lawyers embrace the idea that 
"more information must be better, without regard for the cost of that information 
or the need for it.» 14 
This tendency of American litigators ill suits the Digital Age, in which the vol-
ume of information has grown hugely and threatens to grow even more hugely in 
the relatively near future. The consequences for E-Discovery are becoming appar-
ent. Already generating annual revenue of $10 billion in 2015,15 the market is pre-
dicted to rise to nearly $22 billion by 2022.16 
Already, the notion that" all" information related to specified topics can be )0-
cated and produced seems often to be implausible. Many companies and govern-
mental entities have digital information in multiple forms and myriad locations. 
The prevalence of BYOD (bring your own device) policies throughout much of 
American business means that company information often resides on hundreds or 
thousands of handheld devices belonging to employees. The expansion of sociaJ 
media activity and reliance on handheld devices means that ordinary Americans 
have digital informacion in greater volumes than substantial business enterprises of 
the mid 20th century possessed. The supposedly imminent arrival of the Internet 
of Things - a world in which some 75 billion devices regulating and reporting on a 
wide variety of ordinary activities will probably be linked to the Internet - suggests 
the potentially massive expansion of this eruption of Big Data. 17 At least some in 
the field regard this prospect as a "defining moment in technology history."18 Some 
13 Andrew Wistrich & Jeffrey Rachlinski, How Lawyers' Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 571, 604-06 (20 J3). 
14 ld. at 606. 
15 Ed Silverstein, E-Discovery Market Hits $10 B, Legaltech News, Feb. 2016) at 17. 
," , 
16 E-Discovery Market Growth, Legal Tech News, April 2016, at 23. 
17 See Erik Post, Discovering the Internet of Things, Legaltech News, 01.01.2015. Post as-
serts that already some 10 billion Internet-connected devices such as "titbits" are in op-
eration, and [hat Morgan Stanley forecasts that by 2020 there will be 75 billion of them in 
operation. 
18 See Post, supra note 17. 
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21 See Marcus, supra note 1, at 309-17. 
22 Steinman, supra note 3, at 8. 
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seeking discovery should not be required to prove that it was proportional, the 
Committee Note accompanying the rule amendment was expanded to recognize 
that «the change does not place on the party seeking discovery the burden of ad-
dressing all proportionality considerations. "26 Instead, it recognizes that "[a] party 
claiming undue burden or expense ordinarily has far better information - perhaps 
the only information - with respect to that part of the determination. "27 
Despite these changes, it seems that the rancor resulting from this amendment 
experience has nor entirely died down. Instead, the academic community seems to 
take solace in the idea that major changes are unlikely to emerge from the rules 
process. That is, of course, not a bad thing. As I have observed in the past, the «Big 
Bang" of procedural reform that resulted from the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure is not necessarily something that each generation should repeatJs 
111. The Actual Effect of the 2015 Rule Changes 
One thing that rule makers cannot predict, much less control, is the impact their rule 
changes will have. Sometimes (he impact is much more dramatic than they foresee. 
An example of that might be the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which lead to vigorous litigation and fierce controversy about the 
effects of the expanded availability of sanctions for alleged litigation misconduct.29 
In 1991, the rule makers responded by inviting suggestions for reform, and in 1993 
a number of protectjons were added to the rule, causing its importance to shrink. 
But over-reaction to rule changes is probably tess common than under-reaction. 
One example is the 2000 change to the scope of discovery, the same rule that was 
further revised in the 2015 amendments. The 2000 change was widely and vehe-
mently denounced as "radical" and harmful. But the reality was that it had almost 
no actual effect. In part, that may be because lawyers and judges are set in their 
ways. In part, that may be because they do not pay nearly as much attention to the 
rules (and the ways they change) as those involved in the process. Indeed, a few 
years ago I suggested (only pardy in jest) that key laments of the rule makers would 
include "Judges don\.follow our rules" and "Lawyers don't read our rules."30 
Perhaps hoping to avoid that outcome for the current rule changes, Chief Justice 
Roberts of the US Supreme Court devoted most of his year-end report for the fed-
26 Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(1), 2015 amendments. 
27 Id . 
-' , 
28 See Richard Marcus, Nor Dead Yet, 61 Okla. L. Rev. 299,300-01 (2008) (describing the 
"big bang" in American procedure resulting from the 1938 adoption of (he Federal Rules, 
and forecasting chat such momentous changes will not happen a second time). 
29 See Stephen Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of 
Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L Rev. 1925 (1989). 
30 Richard Marcus, The Rule makers' Laments, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 1639 (2013). 
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eral judiciary on 31.12.2015) to the amendment package.3l One thing the Chid Jus-
tice seemed to be doing was to try to call attention to the rule changes - to prompt 
judges and lawyers at least to take note of them. He urged that they are "a major 
stride toward a better federal court system,"31 adding that "[t]he amendments may 
not look like a big deal at -first glance, but they are. "33 In panicular, the amended rule 
on scope of discovery U states, as a fundamental principle, that lawyers must size and 
shape their discovery requests to the requisites of a case."34 
At least some judges ar~ liste-nlng. A few weeks after the Chief Justice's report 
was issues, one judge began her opinion on a discovery dispute by remarking that 
uChief Justice Roberts, in his Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, noted that 
the most recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intend-
ed to: (1) encourage greater cooperation among counseli·(2) focus discovery ... on 
what is truly necessary to resolve the case; (3) engage judges in early and active case 
management; and (4) address serious new problems associated with vast amounts of 
electronically stored information. "35 • 
Surely some look with enthusiasm on the prospect that the 2015 rule changes will 
do what the Chief Justice endorsed. An article in a magazine for corporate general 
counsel began: "Recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can 
be real game changers with regard to limiting the scope and cost of discovery. "36 
Another magazine for general counsel devoted an entire section to discussing the 
potential effects of the rule changesY Even the Wall Street Journal chimed in with 
an article entitled "Businesses Win Lawsuit Curbs with New Rules. "38 Though that 
prospect may be anathema to some, it might strike the Journal as good news. 
Some have already reported to the Advisory Committee about the perceived ef-
fects of the recent amendments. In April, 2016, one organization warned that "ab-
sent further action to educate the bench and bar, the Commlttee's robust effort -- more 
than five years of work .. . - may be at risk of suffering the same fate as those that 
31 See 2015 Year-End Report on (he Federal Judiciary, available at www.supremecoun.gov/ 
publicinfolyear-cnd/ycar-endrepons.aspx. 
32 id. at 9. 
33 Id. at 5. 
34 Id. at 7. 
3S Kissing Camels Surgery Center, LLC v. Centura Health Corp., 2016 WL 277721 (D. 
Colo., 22.01.2016). 
36 B. Jay Yelton, Rule Amendment Encodes Proportionality, loday's General Counsel, 
30.03.2016. 
37 Sec Perspectives on Procedure: A Civil Rules Rouodtable, Metropolitan Corporate Coun-
sel, Dec. 2015, at 31-37. 
38 Joe Palazzolo & Jess Bravin, Businesses Win Lawsuit Curbs With New Rules, Wall St.]" 
22.03.2016. 
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came before. "39 Some judges may be continuing to use precedent that was originally 
adopted under rule provisions that have been changed or removed. Another com-
mentator found that even though the amendments removed the rule language many 
regarded as authorizing discovery so long as it was a reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence" - rule language consciously removed by the 
2015 amendments - some judges seemed to continue to regard that as defining the 
scope of discovery.40 
Early returns are a risky basis for making long term forecasts; however, so it re-
mains uncertain whether, even with the Chief Justice's exhortations, this set of rule 
changes will cause "real" change. 
IV Moving toward a Culture Change? 
From some perspectives, the central concern is not mainly about rules, but about 
the" culture" of legal practice in the US. Many have regarded that practice as ex-
cessively adversarial, and found that behavior in discovery reflected that excessive 
adversarial zeal. Chief Justice Roberts suggested as much when he said that rule 
changes are not enough: "The success of the 2015 civil rules amendment will require 
more than organized educational efforts. It will also require a genuine commitment, 
by judges and lawyers alike, to ensure that our legal culture reflects the values we all 
ultimately share .... The test for plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel alike is whether 
they will affirmatively search out cooperative solutions, chart a cost-effective course 
of litigation, and assume shared responsibility with opposing counse] to achieve a 
just result. "-+I 
At least some in the bar appreciate that the amended rules support a "cultural" 
challenge. Thus, the Chair of the ABA Section of Litigation wrote that the main 
question is whether the bar will step up to this challenge: "The hope is for a true 
'culture shift' toward active management by the courts and cooperation by the par-
ties. Whether that shift will occur is the most important question we face, and the 
answer will determine the amendments' true impact. "42 
Excessive advcrsarial behavior in American litigation has been decried for over a cen-
tury. Roscoe Pound denounced it in his famous 1906 speech to the American Bar Asso-
39 Lawyers for Civil Justice, An Early Look at Ifow Courts Are Interpreting and Applying 
the 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dated April 8,2016, and 
submined to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
" , 
40 See John Barkett, the First 100 Days (or so) of the 2015 Civil Rules Amendments at 6-
13 (citing cases), available at www.frcpamendments201S.org/upJoads/S/8/6/3/586364211 
barkettfirstl OOdays.pdf, last visited June 2, 2016. 
4l Annual Report, supra note 31, at 10-11. 
42 Lawrence Pulgram, The Discovery Rules I-fave Changed -- But Have We? 42 Litigation 
18,20 (Spring 2016). 
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clation urging procedural reform:H But changing "'culrure" is surely more challenging 
than changing rules, and cultural change is likely to be much more gradual. As we have 
seen,44 experience with past rule changes does not make big changes in behavior seem 
guaranteed this time. Although judges' somewhat frequent invocation of the Chief Jus-
tice's annual message may suggest that some judges are making serious efforts along this 
line;~5 it will probably take more to produce widespread changes in lawyer behavior. 
V. Further Steps - Pilot Programs as Harbingers? 
But the Chief Justice did not contemplate that the rule changes would be the final 
effort. Instead, he exhorted: ('1 encourage all to support the judiciary's plans to test 
the workability of new case management and discoveFY practices through carefully 
conceived pilot programs. "46 
Work has already begun on pilot programs along these lines, and it may bear 
more aggressive fruit than the recent rule amendments .• At its April 2016 meeting, 
the Advisory Committee was presented with an ambitious agenda of plans for en-
couraging voluntary civil litigation programs to be adopted by individual federal 
district courtsY The report cites the 2015 rule amendments and observes that «ad-
ditional innovations in civillicigation may be more likely if they are tested first in 
a series of pilot projects. "48 With that in mind, a Subcommittee of the Advisory 
Committee explored the innovations used in a number of courtS - both state and 
federal- and concluded that two pilot projects should be implemented. 
a) Mandatory Initial DiscO'Very Pilot Project 
The first pilot project builds on a provision already in the national rules, but that 
provision has a rather unhappy history. 25 years ago, the Advisory Committee pro-
posed a rule requiring «initial disclosure» of certain "core information" without the 
need for formal discovery requests. This proposal provokes uproar. 49 Eventually, a 
43 See Roscoe Pound, the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Jus-
tice, 29 Reports of the A.B.A. 395 (1906). 
44 See Part I supra. 
45 A Westlaw search in mid 20 t 6, for example, identifies at least a dozen district court deci-
sions citing the Chief Justice'S repon during the first three months of 2016. 
46 Annual Report, supra note 31, at 9-10. 
47 These plans, and supporting material, appear in the agenda book for the Apri12016 meet-
ing of the Advisory Committee on Civil rules at pp. 441-679. The agenda hook can be 
found at: www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-
rules-civil-procedure-april-2016. 
48 Id. at 441. 
49 For a description of this uproar, see Richard Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Pros-
pect~ for Procedural Progress, 59 Brooklyn L. Rev. 76.,805-12 (1993) 
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less aggressive rule was adopted, and individual federal district courts were explic-
itly permitted to opt out of it. This lack of uniformity led to making the initial dis-
closure rule mandatory nationwide in 2000, but also to limiting it to information the 
disclosing party would use to support its case. Unfavorable information would not 
need to be disclosed. 50 Even so, the national rule also permitted the parties to decide 
not to do any initial disclosure, and authorized the judge to order that it would not 
be employed in a given case even if some parties wanted to use it. 
The proposed pilot program is considerably more aggressive. It does not allow 
the parties to opt out (a1chough the court can relax the initial disclosure requirement 
based on the parties> stipulation to chat effect), and requires the parties to provide 
information" as to facts that are relevant (0 the parries' claims and defenses, whether 
favorable or unfavorable, and regardless of whether they intend to use the informa-
tion in presenting their claims or defenses. "51 It further directs that if such informa-
tion emerges after initial disclosure, a supplemental disclosure must be made within 
30 days.52 Failure to disclose is a ground for sanctions.53 
The potential bite of this regime is indicated by (he following directive: "List the 
documents, electronically stored information (,ESI'), tangible things, land, or other 
property known by you to exist, whether or not in your possession, custOdy or con-
trol, that you believe may be relevant to any party's claims or defenses. To the extent 
the volume of any such materials makes listing them individually impracticable, 
you may group similar documents or ES1 into categories and describe the specific 
categories with particularity. Include in your response the names and, if known, 
the addresses and telephone numbers of the custodians of the documents, ES1, or 
tangible things .... For documents and tangible things in your possession, custody, 
or control, you may produce them with your response, or make them available for 
inspection on the date of the response, instead of listing them. "54 
This is obviously an ambitious potential program. Whether it will move forward 
cannot be predicted with confidence. A quarter century ago, Justice Scalia (joined 
by Justices Souter and Thomas) dissented from adoption of a less aggressive disclo-
sure regime in the Federal Rules: "The proposed new regime does not fit comfort-
ably within the America-q judicial system, which relies on advcrsarial litigation [0 
develop the facts before a neutral decision maker. By placing upon lawyers the ob-
ligation co disclose information damaging [0 their clients - on their own initiative, 
and in a context where the.lines between what must be disclosed and what need not 
be disclosed are not clear but require the exercise of considerable judgment - the 
50 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). 
51 April 2016 agenda book, supra note 47, at 443 fi. 2. 
52 Id. at 444 n. 5. 
53 Id. at 445 o. 10. 
54 Agenda book, supra note 47, at 445. 
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new Rule would place intolerable strain upon lawyers' ethical duty to represent 
their clients and not to assist the opposing side. "55 
b) Expedited Procedures Pilot 
The other proposed pilot project seeks to achieve a goal that has long been attractive 
but defied judges who seek to enlist lawyers and parties to support their effort. The 
effort is to provide expedited trials after abbreviated discovery. Over recent decades, 
individual federal judges have offered to guarantee nonjury prompt trials for simple 
cases if the lawyers and parties would agree to expedited and simplified discovery 
and abjure summary-judgment motions. 
The idea was good - that the costs of "full scale" disc.overy and motions for sum-
rnary judgment actually exceeded the cost of sirnplifi~d pretrial preparation and a 
trial with time limits on both sides for presenting their cases. The recurrent problem 
was that the judges got almost no takers. So the programs went begging. 
One possible explanation for the failure of these programs to attract participa-
tion was that lawyers are exceedingly conservative professionals who were loathe 
to experiment with new ways of resolving djsputes. They may have feared that bad 
outcomes would lead to claims by their clients that they were guilty of malpractice 
for agreeing co "short cut" justice. 
Another (somewhat less persuasive) explanation is that clients themselves insisted 
on doing things the «normal" or "full preparation" way. This explanation is less 
persuasive because much research shows that the people most interested in having 
a trial are clients. For lawyers, trials are a wearing and risky business. For judges, 
they sometimes involve a great deal of work (though often not much more than 
summary judgment motions). Perhaps clients who expect to lose at trial would re-
sist a program that ensures an early trial. They might even favor using discovery as 
a delaying tactic to prevent a case from reaching trial. But it remains true that most 
clients claim to be favorably inclined coward getting their "day in court" and less 
enamored of contemporary American discovery. 
The proposed pilot program would replace the efforts of individual judges to 
obtain voluntary participation with a program that would apply to most civil cases 
in a participating district. 56 The method would include prompt case management 
conferences with the presiding judge, firm caps on the amount of time allowed for 
discovery, prompt resolution of discovery disputes by telephone conferences, judi-
cial commitments to decide all dispositive motions within 60 days of submission, 
and setting fi rm trial datesY 
55 Scalia, J., dissenting from adoption of amendment to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 
F.R.D. 507, 511 (1993). 
56 The program would not apply to "cases decided on an administrative record with no 
trial." Agenda materials, supra note 47, at 448. 
57 See id. 
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There is nothing revolutionary in this program; it involves using tools that have 
been in the ruJes for decades. But the goal would be for each participating district to 
ensure trial dates in 90 % of civil cases within 14 months of case fiEng, and produce 
a 25 % reduction in the number of categories of cases in that district that are decided 
more slowly than the national average. SB «[1lhis project seizes on the tncreased rea-
sonableness associated with discovery that must be finished within a discrete time 
period. A similar dynamic is at play when trial judges allocate a set amount of time 
for each party to make its case at trial. "59 
c) Pro~pects for adoption of pilot projects 
It is not possible presently to forecast whether the pilot projects will be adopted 
or implemented. For one thing, the announced plan is for them to be done district 
court by district court, and getting support from all the judges in a given district 
may often prove to be difficult. 
Perhaps one could gauge the prospects of success for the pilar projects in tandem 
with the prospects for success from the recent rule amendments. On the one hand, 
if the amendments actually eliminate wasteful discovery and prompt more vigorous 
judicial oversight of civil litigation, that development may make the need for under-
takings like the pilot programs recede. On the other hand, the success of the amend-
ment package might usher in a new judicial attitude that would make the adoption 
of pilot programs more attractive. 
VI. Further Reforms for American Class Actions? 
If discovery is the American litigation characteristic most reviled elsewhere, the 
American class action may rank second in that hierarchy. Indeed, as Professor 
Walker observed several years ago during a conference in Moscow: «US-style class 
actions have become a flashpoint for debate over group litigation and the collective 
redress regimes emerging around the world. Everyone wants to develop better ways 
for consumers and otbers who suffer loss from mass harms to receive compensation 
.... But everyone, at least outside the United States, seems also to agree that they do 
not want to adopt US-style class actions in their systems. "60 
The «modern" American class action has now reached its 50th birthday - it was 
created by the 1966 ame~dments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules. It seem's that the 
58 See id. 
59 Id. at 449. 
60 Janet Walker, "General Report," in Dmitry Maleshin (cd.), Civil Procedure in Cross-
Cultural Dialogue: Eurasia Concext 413 (Starut Pub. House 2012). For discussion of the 
evolution of non-American forms of collective relief, see Christopher Hodges, The Re-
form of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems (2008). 
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American rule makers were uncertain then about whether their new creation would 
become important, but it surely has. That explains in part the adverse reaction of 
the rest of the world. 
Since 1966, class action developments (perhaps one can call them ((reforms") have 
come from three sources. 
a) Case law 
As amended in 1966, Rule 23 was a relative spare roadmap for handling class ac-
tions, and the courts had to fill in the interstices with decisional law. Initially, it 
seemed that the federal courts were sometimes too free with use of the device, and 
that freewheeling use of Rule 23 produced something. of a backlash to curtail its 
use. 61 During the 1980s and 19905, the «new thing" in class action litigation was the 
mass tort class action, and in the late 1990s the Supreme Court put a damper on the 
use of this dcvice.b2 
Since 2010, the US Supreme Court has decided a substantial number of c1ass-
action cases.63 Although some might be called plaintiff-side victories, more often 
they favored defense-side views. In the words of one US district judge, the result 
was: "Going forward, the clear directive to plaintiffs seeking class certification - in 
any eype of case - is that they will face a rigorous analysis by the federal couns, 
will not be afforded favorable presumptions from the pleadings or otherwise, and 
must be prepared to prove with facts - and by a preponderance of the evidence-
their compliance with the requirements of Rule 23."64 Although some speculate that 
the death of Justice Antonin Scalia in early 2016 might change these "facts on the 
ground/' that is surely speculation at present. 
61 For a review of these developments, see Arthur Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and 
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 Harv. L. Rev. 664 
(1979). 
62 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (reversing approval of pro-
posed settlcmem of all personal injury claims arising from exposure to asbestos); Ortiz 
v. Fibreboard Corp., 517 U.S. 815 (1999) (reversing approval of "mandatory" class action 
settlement involving asbestos personal injury claims). 
63 For an introduction to several of these decisions, see Mary Kay Kane, The Supreme 
COUrt's Recem Class Action Jurisprudence" Gning into a Crystal Ball, 16 Lewis & Clark 
L. Rev. 1015 (2012). 
64 In re Kosmos Energy Ltd. Securities Litigation, 299 FR.D. 133, 139 (N.D. Tex. 2014). For 
an examination of (he challenges now facing class-action plaintiffs, see Richard Marcus, 
Bending in the Breeze: American Class Actions in the Twenty-First Century, 65 DePaul 
L R~v. 497 (2016). 
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b) Legislation 
Rule 23 emerged from the rulemaking process, itself authorized by the Rules Ena-
bling Act.65 Congress can change or countermand the work product of the rulemak-
ing process, and sometimes it has. There has been one such episode affecting class 
actions, and another proposal is presently before Congress. 
Class Action Fairness Act: Passed in 2005, this legislation expanded federal-court 
jurisdiction to include many more class actions asserting claims under state law.66 It 
also imposed some specific limitations on the procedures in class ac60ns, such as re-
quiring chat state attorneys general be given notice of proposed settlements affecting 
the citizens of their states67 and placing limitations on «coupon settlements. "68 The 
legislation was viewed by some as an effort to curtail the authority of state courts [0 
authorize "nationwide" class actions, in part responding to indications that the rules 
process could not by itself deal effectively with such problems. This Act generated 
considerable concern and academic controversy.69 
Proposed Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act: In 2015, proposed legislation 
was introduced in the US House of Representatives that would limit class certi-
fication by providing: "No federal court shall certify any proposed class seeking 
monetary relief for personal injury or economic loss unless the party seeking to 
maintain such a class action affirmatively demonstrates that each proposed class 
member suffered the same type and scope of injury as the named class representa-
tive or representatives. n70 The ABA has opposed this legislation on the ground 
that it "would severely limit the ability of victims who have suffered a legitimate 
harm to collectively seek justice in a class action lawsuit. "7\ The US Chamber 
of Commerce and various business entities have supported the legislation on the 
ground that it would "help stop the rampant abuse of the class actions proce-
dures. "72 
Such legislative efforts often raise issues about whether Congress should defer to 
the rulemaking process. Thus, the ABA also objected to this proposed legislation 
on the ground that it "would circumvent the time-proven process for amending the 
65 28 USc. 2071-74. 
66 See 28 USc. 1332(d). 
67 See 28 USc. 1715. 
68 See 28 USc. 1712. 
69 For extensive discussion of this statute, see Symposium, Fairness to Whom? Perpsectives 
on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 156 U.~a. L Rev. 1439-2160 (2008) . 
70 H.R. 1927 lea). 
71 Letter from Thomas Susman, Government Affairs Office of the ABA, to Hon. Bob 
Goodlate, Chair, House Judiciary Committee, June 23, 2015. 
72 Letter dated Jan. 6, 2016, from US. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform and 14 other 
groups to the members of the us House of Representatives. 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure established by Congress in the Rules Enabling 
Act. "73 
c) Rulemaking initiatives 
Rulemaking has again focused on class actions. In 2011, the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules established a Rule 23 Subcommittee, which spent several years exam-
ining a variety of contemporary dass-action issues. This outreach included attend-
ing meetings with about a dozen bar groups and convening a full-day conference on 
its own with participants from the bench and bar. 
Eventually, the Committee developed a package of proposed rule amendments, 
largely focused on (he process of reviewing proposed settlements of class actions. 
These include (1) expanded requirements for disclosures in support of such settle-
ments before members of the class are notified of the settlement proposal; (2) more 
focused clarification of the criteria a court should employ in deciding whether to 
approve a proposed settlement and certify a class for that purpose; (3) clarification 
about what class members who object to a proposed settlement must provide the 
court in support of thelr objections; and (4) requiring class action objectors who 
object to a proposed settlement to obtain court approval before they can be paid for 
dropping their objections or appealing from the approval of the settlement. 74 
Under the established schedule for such matters, this package will be subject to 
public comment from 15.08.2016 to 15.02.2017, and then the Advisory Commit-
tee will reflect on the public comment and determine whether to proceed with the 
changes to the mle. It is not possible at this time to predict what the Committee will 
then do. 
VII. Concluding Projections 
As in most countries, procedural reform in the US is an ongoing project. Although 
most countries may have a relatively unified method of developing procedural re-
forms, in the US there are multiple possible sources of change. The federal rule mak-
ers are a very important one, but hardly the only one. Congress and the Supreme 
Coun can play an independent roJe, and have done so repeatedly in recent decades. 
And the CDuns of the various American states can break new ground on their own, 
because they are not limited by federal law in creating innovative procedural ar-
rangements. 
73 ABA lener, supra note 71. 
74 See agenda book, supra note 47, at 96-107. In addition, the Committee has placed two 
issues" on hold» - pick-off offers by defendants seeking to moot a class action by paying 
the individual plaintiff the entire amount he or she would be able to recover, and the ques-
tion of" ascertainabiliry,» dealing with how confidenr (he court must be that it will be able 
to identify all the class members at the rime it certifies the class. 
ZZPlnt 20 (20 t 5) 305 
Modest Prc;cectur,a,l J'la'Vt1.I'i!ces in the US 
will continue to heat 
and the prospect is for more vitriol and nAI':lrI7~,tlr.n 
as well as betvteen them .. J ......... '~n .... ,.,"T 
a 
the increased erripttaSIS 
toward the opera.tlUlg 
306 
